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I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals grounded a right to assisted
suicide in Compassion in Dying v. Washington on the principles of
personal dignity and autonomy.1 Although the court determined that
these principles justify a right to assisted suicide as coherently as they
would a right to the "intimate and personal choice" of abortion,2
assisted suicide differs from abortion because it implicates the state's
power to protect actual-rather than potential'-human life. Because
the Court in Roe v. Wade classified the fetus as only a potential human
being,4 the Court did not defer to the states' traditional authority to
protect human life. In contrast, the Court recognized that the human
life at stake in the case of assisted suicide is an actual one. Therefore,
to justify a right of assisted suicide, the judiciary must defend
arrogating power that it has historically ceded to the states.
This Article will examine the Ninth Circuit's appeal to personal
dignity and autonomy to justify a constitutional right of assisted
suicide in the face of pluralist opposition, that is, a law duly enacted
by a majority of elected representatives in a state or by the people
directly.' Scrutiny of the Ninth Circuit's decision will reveal the
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1. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). "[Tlhe
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-163 (1973).
4. See id. at 159.
5. The term pluralism has many different meanings. In this article, pluralism means
government where the people enact laws directly or through their elected representatives.
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formidable jurisprudential obstacles to basing a right to assisted suicide
on dignity and autonomy, obstacles the Supreme Court refused to
overcome in revoking Compassion in Dying.6 This examination is
divided into three parts: the first analyzes attempts to justify rights on
the principle of liberty, to which autonomy and dignity reduce; the
second focuses specifically on the Ninth Circuit's attempt to ground a
right to assisted suicide on this principle; and the third examines three
responses to the challenge that pluralism presents to the Ninth
Circuit's decision.
II. DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY
A. Neutrality Is Necessary
A crucial tenet of contemporary liberal legal and political theory
asserts that the government must remain neutral to competing views
of the good, or morality. Championed by such eminent liberals as
Ronald Dworkin 7 and John Rawls,' this tenet has gained currency as
a jurisprudential principle: jurists cite it to override state laws
regarding matters of personal morality. For example, a Michigan
Supreme Court justice upheld a right to assisted suicide, claiming:
"Defining liberty, therefore, cannot involve a morality play by any
group or by a general disapproval by the majority of this Court."9
The argument for pluralism would also justify the decision of Oregon citizens to legalize
assisted suicide. Pluralists are committed to democracy, whether it be direct or representative;
pluralists would support both the Oregon plebiscite that supported a right to assisted suicide and
the Washington Legislature's proscription of the act. This Article neither defends nor criticizes
the right to assisted suicide per se, but focuses only on the judiciary's justification for overriding
the citizenry's choice regarding assisted suicide, whatever the choice might be.
6. The Supreme Court reversed primarily because, under current Due Process methodology,
(1) the proposed right is not carefully formulated and deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition and is thus not a fundamental liberty interest, and (2) Washington's ban is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271. This Article
constructs a philosophical criticism of the Ninth Circuit's decision on the basis of pluralism and
on that decision's misapplication of the concepts of liberty, autonomy, and dignity.
7. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
PRINCIPLE]. "[E]quality supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible,
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life ....
[T]he government does not treat [citizens] as equals if it prefers one conception to another .. "
Id. See also Peter De Marneffe, Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 253
(1990) (effectively critiquing Dworkin's position, particularly with regard to freedom of religion).
8. See JOHN RAWLS, POIIncAL LIBERALISM 191-194 (1993) (defending the necessity of
neutrality much more vigorously than Dworkin as well as offering a more philosophical
understanding of neutrality).
9. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 752 (Mich. 1994) (Mallett, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (stating that "[olur obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code").
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Therefore, liberal scholars and jurists bear the self-imposed burden of
justifying a right to assisted suicide without imposing morality.
B. The Equivalence of Liberty, Autonomy, and Dignity
The Ninth Circuit upheld a right to assisted suicide in Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, agreeing with the Supreme Court's statement
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that"choices central to personal dignity and autonomy are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' °  Therefore, to
secure the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, the act of assisted
suicide must fulfill two requirements: the choice to participate in this
act must be central to personal dignity and autonomy, and the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must encompass choices related
to personal dignity and autonomy. The former claim will be conceded;
the latter, however, is problematic.
The substance of the Due Process Clause has been disputed at
least since the Warren Court initially invoked it to justify individual
rights." The Due Process Clause does not protect every act of
liberty, and in the last thirty years the Supreme Court has attempted
to articulate criteria establishing which free acts the general right to
liberty protects. 2 Previously the Court claimed that acts of a certain
private nature enjoy constitutional protection and employed this
criterion to justify rights to the liberties of purchasing contraceptives 3
and obtaining an abortion.'4
In Casey, the Justices eschewed privacy in favor of two other
criteria--dignity and autonomy-to distinguish among acts of liberty
that the Due Process Clause protects.15 The Ninth Circuit's justifica-
tion in Compassion in Dying of a right to assisted suicide, which
appealed directly to Casey's criteria, depends entirely on the coherence
of dignity and autonomy as jurisprudential principles."
If the concepts of dignity and autonomy distinguish those acts of
liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, then these concepts
must differ in some relevant respect from liberty; otherwise jurists
would be attempting to distinguish among acts of liberty by the
10. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle
Terre Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
13. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
14. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. See id. at 851.
16. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 790.
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criterion of liberty, which is not possible. However, neither the
judiciary nor legal scholars have ever clearly differentiated either
autonomy or dignity from liberty.
The Supreme Court has frequently employed autonomy in
constitutional jurisprudence. For example, it has recognized the
autonomy of the individual to control unwanted mail, 7 to represent
herself in court,'" and to choose the editorial content of publica-
tions. 9 In all of these instances, the Court could have substituted
liberty for autonomy without altering the import of these rights. In
Casey, the Court also used liberty and autonomy indistinguishably,
claiming, "[t]he woman's constitutional liberty interest also involves
her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most
personal nature";2 ° and, "[d]ecisional autonomy must limit the State's
power to inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its own
view of what is best."121 In constitutional jurisprudence, both liberty
and autonomy protect a woman's right to make important personal
decisions for herself.22 Thus, the Court has identified autonomy with
liberty for many decades, and recently has employed it to ground
important personal rights.
Liberal scholars also identify autonomy with the classical
understanding of liberty. Joseph Raz claims that personal autonomy"is essentially about the freedom of persons to choose their own
lives,"2 and Ronald Dworkin states that individuals' right to
autonomy is "a right to make important decisions defining their own
17. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
18. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975).
19. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 178 (Powell, J., concurring).
20. Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
identification of autonomy and liberty follows extant legal scholarship. See also Note, Physician-
Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1992) ("The
right to be free from governmental interference in making fundamental personal decisions is the
core notion of due process liberty. The right to privacy, which state courts often cite as a basis
for a right to die, is also rooted in an ideal of individual autonomy.") (citations omitted).
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens stated that "[p]art of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each
of us is entitled." Id. at 920.
22. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 73 (J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd. eds., 1910) (arguing that "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others").
23. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 370, n.2 (1986) "Is the autonomous
wrongdoer a morally better person than the non-autonomous wrongdoer? Our intuitions rebel
against such a view. It is surely the other way around." Id. at 380.
264 [Vol. 21:261
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lives for themselves. 2 4 John Stuart Mill, the classical liberal, stated
that the principle of liberty "requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character .. ."2 Hence,
it appears that neither the Supreme Court nor liberal scholars have
differentiated autonomy from liberty.
The Supreme Court has also used dignity in a sense indistinguish-
able from autonomy or liberty, namely, the freedom or right of
individuals to decide important personal matters for themselves. In
Casey, the Court claimed, "A woman considering abortion faces a
difficult choice having serious and personal consequences of major
importance to her own future-perhaps to the salvation of her own
immortal soul. The authority to make such traumatic and yet
empowering decisions is an element of basic dignity."26
The judiciary must cast dignity in the same voluntarist light as
autonomy; otherwise, it would patently impose a view of the good. It
cannot claim, for example, that everyone suffering grievously from
terminal cancer must partake in assisted suicide in order to preserve
dignity; rather, death with dignity is the death that the individual
autonomously chooses, whether by assisted suicide or natural causes.
If jurists proposed a substantive code of dignified human action, then
they would be imposing an axiology and constraining an individual's
choice-whatever it might be-in important personal matters. Thus,
when it asserts that human dignity safeguards an individual's choice
regarding the manner of her death, the judiciary reduces dignity to
autonomy and liberty.
C. The Ethical Basis of the Harm Principle
If personal dignity and autonomy do not relevantly differ from
liberty, then the concept of liberty must protect important personal
decisions, such as the right to assisted suicide, from the tyranny of
pluralism, i.e., the majority vote of elected representatives or the people
themselves. The point of departure for establishing claims to liberty
is John Stuart Mill's harm principle, which prohibits the majority from
24. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 222 (1993). See also JOSEPH V. DOLAN, S.J.,
Ethics as Philosophy of Freedom, in FREEDOM AND VALUES 29-49 (Robert & Johann ed., 1976)
(making the same distinctions regarding liberty as others do about autonomy, i.e., the character-
istics required by the capacity of liberty versus the actual exercise of it).
25. MILL, supra note 22, at 75.
26. Casey, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
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circumscribing an individual's liberty unless the act harms others.27
The judiciary routinely adjudicates liberty claims on the basis of their
harmful ramifications, as paradigmatically illustrated in Justice
Holmes's rejection of the free speech act of screaming "Fire!" in a
movie theater because of the act's potential harm.28
Although the harm principle animates nearly all liberal political
and legal theory,29 it presents contemporary liberalism with an
insoluble contradiction: an individual judges an act as harmful only
when she thinks a good is being subverted. As Joseph Raz notes,
Since 'causing harm' entails by its very meaning that the action is
prima facie wrong, it is a normative concept acquiring its specific
meaning from the moral theory within which it is embedded.
Without such a connection to a moral theory, the harm principle is
a formal principle lacking specific concrete content and leading to no
policy conclusions.3
The contradiction facing contemporary liberals is that when a
jurist recognizes an individual right because of the harm caused by
some statute, or proscribes the liberty to an act that the jurist considers
harmful, she necessarily invokes a theory of the good or morality.
Therefore, when jurists recognize a personal right because of some
important interests at stake, they adjudicate on the basis of an axiology,
in which some values or goods occupy a more prominent position than
other values.
If the goods in question are nearly universally acknowledged, then
recognition of rights to the goods will be uncontroversial. Jurists did
not create a controversy when they recognized the autonomy of the
individual to be free of unwanted mail because the vast majority of
citizens acknowledged this good.3 Nor should the recognition of an
individual's right to marry, socialize, or receive an education raise
opposition, because of the near-unanimous assent to these goods.32
However, prevalent dissent regarding other unenumerated
constitutional rights stems precisely from the disparate views of the
27. See MILL, supra note 22, at 73 (arguing that "the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others").
28. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
29. Nearly every liberal scholar recurs to the harm principle in his or her legal theory. See,
e.g., RAZ, supra note 23, at 412-20; see also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY
(1963); JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).
30. See RAZ, supra note 23, at 414.
31. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
32. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 21:261
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good that jurists, legal scholars, and other citizens retain, and the
consequent disagreement regarding whether harm is created when these
goods are infringed. For example, the extant conflict regarding hate-
speech codes hinges on disparate notions of the good: supporters of
such codes point to the good of self-awareness or civility that racist or
sexist speech violates;33 opponents advert to the good of free expres-
sion that speech codes impede.34 Similarly, pornography is perceived
as harmful by those who esteem the multidimensional nature of
women, while its suppression is harmful to those who uphold the good
of free speech.3" Hence, a jurist adjudicates rights' claims according
to her estimation of the goods underlying each particular claim.
The harm principle is an essential component of every legal or
political theory because members of society cannot tolerate every act
of liberty, and therefore they invoke the harm principle to eschew acts
that conflict with their view of the human good. But if the harm
principle requires a theory of the good in application, then the judiciary
imposes a theory of the good whenever it upholds or denies a
constitutional right based on the harms a statute inflicts upon an
individual's dignity and autonomy (i.e., liberty). As such, it thereby
institutes what it and liberal scholars prohibit the legislative branch of
the government from enacting, namely, a state-imposed view of the
good.
Liberal scholars have overlooked that Mill explicitly tethered his
doctrine of liberty to utilitarianism,36 and therefore he was able to
justify individual liberties or rights by appealing to their utility, e.g.,
free speech is good and must be protected because it facilitates the
good of attaining the truth.37 Mill perceived that in defending rights
to individual liberties, he would be upholding a view of the good,
33. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 895 (1994).
34. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989); Robert
C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 279-
285 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959) (holding a California statute
which dispensed with any mens rea requirement as to the contents of an obscene book would
violate the First Amendment).
36. See MILL, supra note 22, at 74. Miff further stated, "I regard utility as the ultimate
appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the
permanent interests of a man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the
subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of each,
which concern the interests of other people." Id.
37. See id. at 82 ("There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted.
Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but fact and arguments, to
produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it.").
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which in his theory was utilitarianism.38  Contemporary liberal
scholars seek to isolate rights from morality, but in appealing to
autonomy and dignity-which they use indistinguishably from
liberty-to demarcate the limits of individual liberty, they unwittingly
impose a view of the good. In addition, this argument is a tautology:
if autonomy and dignity do not differ from liberty, then just as the
concept of liberty cannot discriminate among acts of liberty that engage
the Due Process Clause, neither can dignity nor autonomy.39
D. The Ethical Basis of Adjudication
If, instead of appealing to autonomy and dignity, liberal scholars
appropriately appealed to the goods or "interests" that autonomy and
dignity are instrumental in obtaining, then autonomy and dignity
would not justify the rights.4" However, the rights would then
depend on a view of the good, which would undermine contemporary
liberal dogma.41 Thus, liberal scholars and jurists face the quandary
of justifying the liberty to engage in certain acts such as assisted
suicide by either invoking the tautologous concepts of autonomy and
dignity, which therefore justify nothing, or appealing to a view of the
good, which would undermine the very basis of contemporary
liberalism.
Jurists conceal the moral basis of constitutional jurisprudence by
describing disputes over rights as conflicts between citizens' "interests"
because this term retains an aura of neutrality that "goods" does not.
However, something is an interest for an individual only if it is good
for her, either in a teleological or voluntarist sense: the Aristotelian
proponent would maintain that certain acts of free speech are in an
individual's interest because they are perfective of her;42 the Hobbes-
ian supporter would claim that such acts are in her interest only if she
finds these acts good or (equivalently for Hobbes) desirable.43 Hence,
38. See id. at 1-60.
39. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
40. For a similar argument, see Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 536-38 (1989).
41. See id. at 537.
42. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. X, Ch. 5, 603 (H. Rackharn ed., Harvard
University Press 1962) (1926) ("[Slince activities differ in moral value, and some are to be
adoopted, others to be avoided, and others again are neutral, the same is true also of their
pleasures: for each activity has a pleasure of its own.").
43. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 39 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press
1991) (1651) ("But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he
for his part calleth good .... For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with
relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so ... ").
[Vol. 21:261
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whether construed in a teleological or voluntarist sense, "interests" are
inextricably linked to a theory of the good, and the act of balancing
"interests" is in fact balancing conflicting goods.
Jurists further obscure the moral dimension of certain constitu-
tional disputes by framing disputes over rights as conflicts between the
interests of the individual and the "state." However, the disputes that
jurists mediate do not concern the individual and the state so much as
discrepant views of the good. In regard to assisted suicide, for example,
some citizens support a right to assisted suicide because of the good it
entails and the harm it prevents; others oppose it because of the
potential harm incurred by the act.14  This dispute does not pit the
individual against the state; rather, it involves two groups of individu-
als-each represented by some legislators-who seek to attain
conflicting goods. Therefore, regardless of which interests the
legislature or the Ninth Circuit supported, each would ineluctably
impose a view of the good. The next section will analyze the
conflicting views of the goods at stake in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington.45
III. THE COURTS VERSUS THE PEOPLE
This section will apply the critique set forth in the previous
section to the Ninth Circuit's decision, in particular its attempt to
employ dignity and autonomy without imposing morality. Rather than
justifying a right to assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit's opinion will
manifest the cogency of the pluralist challenge.
At the outset of Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth
Circuit majority acknowledged an individual's liberty interest in
choosing the time and manner of her death, because this choice is
central to personal dignity and autonomy.46 But it claims that a right
can be granted only if this liberty interest outweighs the state's
competing interests, among which are its interests in preserving life, 47
preventing suicide,48 avoiding undue influences of third parties,49
preventing a slide to more dubious types of killing,"° protecting family
44. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 790.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 801.
47. See id. at 818.
48. See id. at 820-24.
49. See id. at 825-27.
50. See id. at 830-32.
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members,51 and safeguarding the integrity of the medical profes-
sion.52
The Ninth Circuit majority putatively undermined the state's
interest in preserving life and preventing suicide by equating the
suspension of life-support with assisting in suicide: since the state
permits the former, then it must allow the latter.5 3 The jurists further
claimed that the state could circumvent abuses by implementing a
precise set of restrictions. 4 After also vitiating the other interests that
the legislature cited, the jurists upheld an individual's interest in
assisted suicide as more compelling, "for no decision is more painful,
delicate, personal, important, or final than the decision of how and
when one's life shall end.""5 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the Washington statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, by falsely
distinguishing the acts of killing and letting die, and the Due Process
Clause, by denying an individual the autonomy to make the important
and personal choice to be assisted in suicide.
But the question persists: why should the judiciary's weighing of
interests supplant the legislature's? The legislature undoubtedly
considered the interests of some individuals in committing suicide and
those of others in forbidding it, and then decided that the latter were
more compelling than the former.56 It could not have been oblivious
51. See id. at 827.
52. See id. at 827-30.
53. See id. at 821-24. The Ninth Circuit's attempt to equate acts of withdrawing life-
support with acts of intentionally killing by overdose also involves a moral claim. The idea that
the acts of killing and letting die are relevantly similar can only be maintained within a utilitarian
framework. For utilitarians, only the consequences of an act-not the agent's inten-
tion--determine the moral character of any act. If one person is removed from a ventilator, with
the foreknowledge that this act will eventuate in his death, and the patient dies, while another dies
after receiving an intentionally lethal overdose, the two acts are judged similarly.
But this rationale contradicts the western moral tradition which has always considered intent
in the moral judgment of any act. For example, a legislature's decision to increase the speed limit
on highways will knowingly result in more deaths; however, the legislature's act is not morally
equivalent to a sniper's act of killing motorists; the legislature's act might be imprudent, but it
is not homicidal.
Moreover, the American legal tradition has always acknowledged the role of intent in
distinguishing between certain acts. The distinction between manslaughter and second-degree
murder is based precisely on intent: the perpetrator of manslaughter does not intend his victim's
death, while the second-degree murderer does. Hence, jurists who maintain the similarity
between acts of killing and letting die embrace a theory that undermines important elements of
the American legal tradition. Moreover, even ifjurists could defend this theory, they would still
be imposing a moral theory, namely, utilitarianism, on the majority.
54. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 833.
55. Id. at 837.
56. See generally id. at 790 (weighing all respective interests and discussing the Washington
Legislature's weighing of all interests).
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to the "painful, delicate, personal important, or final" nature of this
choice, or to the suffering that might be endured if it proscribed
assisted suicide. 7 Only after the legislature weighed and debated the
conflicting views of the good, or interests, did the majority of
legislators opt to ban assisted suicide; only after this deliberation did
the good of banning the act become a "state" interest, even though it
remained the interests of individuals-a majority of them.
The Ninth Circuit tried to distinguish its deliberation from the
Legislature's by citing only the Legislature's reasons for opposing
assisted suicide, while neglecting to mention that the legislators
considered the impact of their legislation on the lives of all individuals,
including themselves and their loved ones."8 The Ninth Circuit
claimed that it balanced the state interests against the interests of the
individual, as if the Legislature overlooked the latter. In fact, the
Washington Legislature weighed the respective interests of both
parties-as did the Ninth Circuit. 9
But if both the Legislature and the jurists weighed the same
interests, then the jurists must justify substituting their judgment of
what are the more weighty or compelling interests. In the conclusion
of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit majority assented to the proposition
that matters of life and death should not be determined by the
judiciary.6" However, they claimed to be submitting to a constitu-
tional mandate to take such decisions out of the hands of government
and put them in the hands of the people. Whence comes such a
mandate? Not directly from the Constitution, but from the Casey
decision's claim regarding the concepts of personal dignity and
autonomy. The jurists declared "[u]nder our constitutional system,
neither the state nor the majority of the people in a state can impose
its will upon the individual in a matter so highly 'central to personal
dignity and autonomy."' 61 Hence, the jurists invoked the principles
of personal dignity and autonomy-which depend on morality-to
usurp the power of the state to protect the good of actual human life.
The Ninth Circuit thereby imposed its own theory or "will" to
safeguard citizens from their own morality, as imposed by their
57. See id.
58. See id. at 790.
59. See generally id. (weighing all respective interests and discussing the Washington
Legislature's weighing of all interests).
60. See id. at 838-39.
61. Id. at 839 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
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democratically elected representatives.62 The jurists overlooked that
the legislators or the majority of citizens can avail themselves of the
concepts of dignity and autonomy as readily as the individuals seeking
a right to assisted suicide. If dignity and autonomy are the paramount
values that the Constitution protects, then the judiciary denies dignity
and autonomy to the majority of individuals or their elected representa-
tives, for whom protecting actual human life and preventing social
deterioration are central to autonomy and dignity.
In response, the judiciary could claim that those denied assisted
suicide by the state lose a greater amount of dignity and autonomy
than the majority enacting the law, but then the judiciary must
quantify values that defy quantification.63 The only coherent means
of quantifying these values in our democracy is to invest each person's
dignity and autonomy with equal value and then count heads, which
is a process that resembles pluralism. Without imposing a view of the
good, the judiciary certainly cannot claim that the interests associated
with the right to assisted suicide are more essential to dignity and
autonomy than are those interests associated with the act's proscrip-
tion."
The judiciary might claim that those denied assisted suicide suffer
more by the state's legislation than the majority does by the judicial
recognition of the right, but this response fails on several counts.
First, suffering is no more quantifiable than autonomy,6 especially if
all types of suffering are taken into account. The judiciary must
include in its calculations the mental suffering of people who would
fear that they will be euthanized involuntarily. Second, if the judiciary
were to overrule any law that imposes more pain on the individual than
on the majority, then the judiciary would need to invalidate many such
laws, including most criminal laws.
62. This contradiction is all the more egregious insofar as the Ninth Circuit majority
acknowledges that a person's philosophy and values will influence her conclusions regarding
assisted suicide. Id. at 800. "One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw
edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitude toward life and family and their
values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and
to color one's thinking and conclusions .. " Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973)).
Yet the jurists, who are susceptible to the same influence, proceeded to adjudicate the issue.
63. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 270 (1977) (criticizing attempts
to establish basic rights by adverting to the "greater" loss of liberty involved, which would require
quantifying liberty).
64. The Ninth Circuit hints at such an axiology above in claiming that no decision is "more
painful, delicate, personal, important, or final...." Furthermore pluralists can claim that the
decision to prohibit the act is also personal and painful. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 837.
65. One of the shortcomings of utilitarianism stems from its historical failure to offer some
means of quantifying pleasure and pain.
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The crucial constitutional question at stake is whose view of
dignity and autonomy should be legislated: that of the minority, for
whom assisted suicide comports with dignity and autonomy, or the
majority, for whom it does not? Jurists who override state law by
appealing to Casey beg this question because individuals on either side
of the issue risk loss of their autonomy and dignity; therefore, the
judiciary must justify upholding the minority's view of autonomy and
dignity as it relates to assisted suicide at the expense of the majority's
view.66 The next section will examine several attempts to defend this
judicial usurpation of legislative power.
IV. ATTEMPTED REFUTATIONS OF PLURALISM
This section will explore three responses to the pluralist critique,
two of which were offered in the context of assisted suicide. The first
response displays the malign neglect with which some jurists treat
pluralism; the other two reveal its cogency.
A. Judicial Response for Pluralism
The first response to the pluralist challenge is contained in the
Ninth Circuit majority's opinion in Compassion in Dying v. Washing-
ton.67 To defend their invalidation of the statute prohibiting assisted
suicide, the Ninth Circuit jurists assert that balancing the individual's
interests and the state's is "quintessentially a judicial role."6 They
claim that, despite the efforts of generations of courts to attach values
to the different factors in cases such as assisted suicide, balancing the
interests "entails the exercise of judicial judgment rather than the
application of scientific or mathematical formulae. No legislative body
can perform the task for us. Nor can any computer. In the end ...
we must rely on our judgment, guided by the facts and the law as we
perceive them.'"69
The Ninth Circuit's attempt to justify its action-in the face of a
pluralist proscription of assisted suicide-is deficient. Obviously no
scientific or mathematical formula can resolve the conflict between the
discrepant interests or morality of individual citizens: no one has ever
maintained otherwise. But the majority classifies the tenable alterna-
tive, namely, representative democracy, among patently untenable
66. Note that the judiciary would face the same pluralist argument if it invalidated
legislation guaranteeing a right to assisted suicide.
67. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
68. Id. at 836.
69. Id.
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options, as if it were not even worthy of discussion. This is not a
probative response to pluralism, nor a sufficient justification for judicial
activism; rather, it is malign neglect of the entire issue.
Remarkably, the majority later criticizes those who oppose assisted
suicide for attempting to force their views and philosophies "on all the
other members of a democratic society."7 The question left unan-
swered is why the elected representatives are unfit to mediate the
conflicting interests of those supporting or opposing assisted suicide.
Only a court oblivious to the moral and philosophical underpinnings
of its own position can accuse those opposed to assisted suicide-whose
views persuaded an elected, representative majority of legislators---of
imposing their views on the citizens of a democratic society.
B. The Right to Privacy and Pluralism
A second response to the pluralist challenge is offered by Jeb
Rubenfeld, who dispositively critiques attempts to ground a right to
assisted suicide on the liberty of defining one's personhood.7
Rubenfeld claims that the right to privacy can ground a right to
assisted suicide because state proscriptions against assisted suicide force
the individual to live a particular, all-consuming, totally dependent,
rigidly standardized life.72 Rubenfeld holds that the state does not
retain the power to foist this type of life on citizens.73
Even if Rubenfeld's mischaracterization of the lives of the
terminally ill were accurate, his notion of privacy would prevent the
state from conscripting armies or imprisoning citizens. In both of
these lawful actions, the majority (or their representatives) more rigidly
standardizes the lives of citizens than in proscribing assisted suicide.
When elected representatives conscript an army, they force individuals
to forego their families, friends, education, and employment-in short,
the most meaningful aspects of their lives. Their commanding officers
then attempt to standardize nearly every aspect of conscripts' lives,
prescribing how to walk, talk, dress, and eat, among myriad other
details. Moreover, they might ultimately be ordered to risk their lives
70. Id. at 839.
71. Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 754-55 (1989) ("Where
is our self-definition not at stake? Virtually every action a person takes could arguably be said to
be an element of his self-definition.").
72. See id. at 795. ("For right-to-die patients, being forced to live is in fact to be forced
into a particular, all-consuming, totally dependent, and indeed rigidly standardized life: the life
of one confined to a hospital bed, attached to medical machinery, and tended to by medical
professionals.").
73. See id. at 795-96.
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for their country. If the state lawfully retains the power to conscript
and then rigidly standardize nearly every aspect of soldiers' lives, then
it should also be free to forbid citizens from assisting in suicide.
Rubenfeld might attempt to justify the state's right to conscript
soldiers by appealing to the importance of the general welfare in
wartime, but he thereby admits that the needs or desires of the
majority to attain some good outweighs the individual's right to avoid
standardization. This same argument justifies proscription of assisted
suicide.
Legislative majorities likewise enact laws that mandate imprison-
ment for certain acts. If the state or the majority retains the authority
to standardize an individual's existence by incarceration-even for the
rest of her life-then it should also retain the power to prohibit assisted
suicide. Critics might respond that society incarcerates only those who
transgress the law, but this response would miss the point. The
majority not only establishes certain acts as unlawful, but it also
imprisons some transgressors. Rubenfeld's notion of privacy might
allow the majority to punish by fines or other similar measures, but it
would undermine the majority's right to incarcerate. Thus, Ruben-
feld's attempt to uphold a right to assisted suicide in the face of
majority opposition cannot be sustained if the majority can lawfully
standardize citizens by conscription or incarceration.
Rubenfeld's argument illuminates the inadequacy of a right to
privacy; namely, it does not differ from the right to autonomy in
contemporary jurisprudence.74 The Supreme Court, for example,
claims that the right to privacy grounds an individual's important
personal choices,7" which is precisely what the right to autonomy
safeguards.76 Like autonomy, liberty, and dignity, privacy reduces to
a voluntarist conception of law: the constitution protects a person's
self-defining choices because the person chooses them. But the ethical
basis of these rights is manifested by the judiciary's specification of
only particular acts as fundamental, e.g., to marry77 or procreate,7"
but not others, e.g., to gamble.79 And the Court even restricts the
acts that it protects by permitting only certain forms of these self-
74. See id.
75. See Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. See Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 795-96.
77. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) ("[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental
right.").
78. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
79. See Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 423 (1955).
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defining practices, such as monogamy, but not others that might be
equally important to one's personhood, such as polygamy. Irrespective
of the terminology that jurists employ in discussing rights, they can
justify certain practices only by adverting to their attendant benefits or
harms, which ultimately depend on a view of the good. Therefore,
attempts to justify assisted suicide by appealing to other rights will
incur the same criticism as the right to autonomy.
C. The Pluralist Challenge to Dworkin's Democracy
The third response to the pluralist challenge is offered by Ronald
Dworkin, previously an outspoken advocate of government neutrality
on issues of "personal morality,"80 who has recently abandoned this
position. In the introduction of his latest work, Dworkin admits that
the government, or at least its judicial branch, imposes morality in
interpreting the Constitution."' Dworkin's admission exposes him to
the force of the pluralist challenge, which he attempts to undermine.
Dworkin denies that a constitutional conception of democracy, in
which the judiciary enjoys ultimate control over individual rights,
infringes the citizens' liberty of self-government. 2 Dworkin claims
that democracy prevails only if all citizens enjoy moral membership in
a political community, which he describes as the type of membership
that engages self-government. An individual truly participates in self-
government only if several conditions are met. 3 One of the condi-
tions is moral independence; a genuine political community is a
community of independent moral agents, 4 because "[s]omeone who
believes in his own responsibility for the central values of his life
cannot yield that responsibility to a group even if he has an equal vote
in its deliberations."" Hence, democracy does not prevail if individu-
als cannot take responsibility for their central values.
80. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1-6 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom's Law].
81. [W]e all-judges, lawyers, citizens-interpret and apply these abstract [constitution-
al] clauses on the understanding that they invoke moral principles about political
decency and justice. The First Amendment, for example, recognizes a moral principle.
... The moral reading therefore brings political morality into the heart of constitution-
al law.... Judges whose political convictions are conservative will naturally interpret
abstract constitutional principles in a conservative way.... Judges whose convictions
are more liberal will naturally interpret those principles in a liberal way....
Id. at 2-3.
82. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 80, at 17.
83. See id. at 24 ("The democratic conditions are the conditions of moral membership in
a political community.").
84. See id.
85. Id. at 26.
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According to Dworkin, "majoritarianism" does not guarantee self-
government unless all members of a political community are treated as
moral members. Thus, even if German Jews had been granted the
franchise to determine whether they would be exterminated, they
would not have been treated as moral members.8 6 Therefore, a body
other than the majority must determine the conditions of moral
membership, that is, which important personal values a citizen should
determine for herself; for Dworkin, the judiciary should assume this
role.87 Once the judiciary safeguards the conditions of moral mem-
bership, then citizens may legislate the remaining political and social
issues.
Although Dworkin offers a novel defense of contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence, such as the Ninth Circuit's decision, his
theory is vulnerable on several counts. First, he attempts to justify his
notion of a constitutional democracy by selectively citing cases that the
Supreme Court has adjudicated, such as Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka.8 However, Dworkin never explains how his notion of
constitutional democracy overcomes the legacy of Dred Scott,89 Plessy
v. Ferguson,9" Buck v. Bell,91 or other infamous cases in which the
judiciary denied moral membership to individuals. If past or potential
injustices are the reason to abandon pluralism (or "majoritarianism"),
then a constitutional democracy has proved as dangerous as a pluralist
form of government. Therefore, if the raison d'etre of a constitutional
democracy is to guarantee inclusion of everyone in the moral commu-
nity, then Dworkin's criticism of pluralism's potential errors under-
mines the tenability of a constitutional democracy as well.
The second deficiency of Dworkin's theory is contained in his
claim that a person cannot cede the responsibility for the central values
of her life to a group, even if she can participate in its vote.92 But
Dworkin never explains why an individual should yield the same
responsibility to a group in which she cannot even participate, i.e., the
judiciary. An individual would foolishly imperil her central values by
86. See id. at 23.
87. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 80, at 24.
88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
89. 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded by Constitutional Amendments XIII and XIV as stated in
Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
90. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
91. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
92. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 80, at 26.
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vouchsafing her "moral independence" or liberty to a body she cannot
influence.
Once Dworkin admits that jurists interpret the Constitution
according to "their different understandings of central moral values
embedded in the Constitution's text,"93 and that each judge interprets
this document in accord with her political convictions, whether liberal
or conservative,94 then the people can demand the right to impose the
morality of the majority, rather than tether their moral lives to the
caprice of federal judges. Even more sobering is Dworkin's claim that
an individual's impact on the democratic process through her one vote
is so negligible that constitutional restraints "cannot be thought to
diminish [her power] enough to count as objectionable for that
reason.""5 Such notions undermine not only pluralism, but democra-
cy as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit decision in Compassion in Dying v. Washington
manifests the dangers of judicial governance, which subverts pluralism
by undermining citizens' right of self-governance. Moreover, the legal
principles invoked by the Ninth Circuit, namely, autonomy and
dignity, cannot coherently justify judicial proscriptions of a right to
assisted suicide.
The continuing controversy over assisted suicide, resolved for now by
the Supreme Court,96 highlights two discrepant notions of the good:
one side upholds the interest or good of individuals in avoiding
suffering and dying in the manner they choose; the other extols the
interest or good of individuals in safeguarding innocent third parties,
discouraging suicide, and protecting human life. The judiciary and the
legislature weigh the same interests in the same manner; not according
to some constitutional principle-because there is none, least of all
liberty or autonomy-but according to the theory of good that each
retains. Therefore, the judiciary arrogates the citizenry's right to self-
93. Id. at 2.
94. See id. at 2-3.
95. Id. at 21 (Dworkin dismisses a "statistical" understanding of democracy, in which
decisions are made by the majority, because "an individual's control over the collective decisions
that affect his life is measured by his power, on his own, to influence the result, and in a large
democracy the power of any individual over national decisions is so tiny that constitutional
restraints cannot be thought to diminish it enough to count as objectionable for that reason.").
96. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, finding no fundamental right to assisted suicide. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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governance when they invalidate the decision of the people or their
representatives, whether that decision be to legalize or criminalize acts
of assisted suicide.
When actual human life is in question, liberal scholars must address
whose morality should prevail in a democratic republic. Two
possibilities exist: the judiciary's or the legislature's. Neither is
infallible, and neither can claim greater moral certainty for its
decisions; human interests can be weighed as readily by one branch of
the government as the other. In the future, if the Supreme Court were
to uphold a right to assisted suicide, liberal scholars and jurists must
justify foisting on the majority in a democratic republic the morality
of a number of unelected officials, namely, five justices on the Supreme
Court, whose tenures are refractory to democratic recall.
Contemporary liberal scholars are committed to the notion of
individual liberty, particularly the individual's freedom from govern-
ment-imposed morality. By allowing the jurists to dictate morality for
the majority of citizens, liberal scholars permit them to subvert the
freedom of a greater number of individuals and thereby violate the
crucial liberal freedom of self- government. The potency of the
pluralist challenge has been understated and underestimated-but has
yet to be undermined.
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